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Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

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Author Info
alok k. bohara (u. new mexico)
alejandro islas camargo (itam, mexico)
theresa grijalva (weber state u.)
kishore gawande (texas a&m)

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Abstract

How many dimensions adequately characterize voting on U.S. trade policy? How are these dimensions to be interpreted? This paper seeks those answers in the context of voting on the landmark 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. The paper takes steps beyond the existing literature. First, using a factor analytic approach, the dimension issue is examined to determine whether subsets of roll call votes on trade policy are correlated. A factor-analytic result allows the use of a limited number of votes for this purpose. Second, a structural model with latent variables is used to find what economic and political factors comprise these dimensions. The study yields two main findings. More than one dimension determines voting in the Senate, with the main dimension driven by economic interest, not ideology. Although two dimensions are required to fully account for House voting, one dimension dominates. That dimension is driven primarily by party. Based on reported evidence, and a growing consensus in the congressional studies literature, this finding is attributed to interest-based leadership that evolves in order to solve collective action problems faced by individual legislators.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0505001.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 03 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0505001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Dimensionality; Roll call voting; Omnibus Trade Act; Interest; Ideology;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kishore Gawande, 1998. "Comparing Theories Of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison Of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 128-140, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kau, James B & Keenan, Donald & Rubin, Paul H, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 271-93, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
  7. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
  8. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-75, September.
  9. Ray, Edward John, 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 105-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. James J. Heckman & James M. Snyder, Jr., 1996. "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators," NBER Working Papers 5785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Stratmann, Thomas, 1996. "How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 603-35, October.
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