Logrolling in the U.S. Congress
AbstractDoes exchange, i.e., vote trading, occur in legislatures? If so, is it quantitatively important or optimal? How important are political parties for the organization of logrolling coalitions? To address these questions, this paper investigates a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported among interests favoring subsidies for urban, labor, and farm interests. The findings suggest that logrolling agreements are widespread, that many Democratic congressmen changed votes because of logrolling agreements, and that the Democratic party served to facilitate logrolling between its members. Furthermore, logrolling coalitions exhibited a strong degree of stability. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 33 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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