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Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

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  • Clifford G. Holderness
  • Randall S. Kroszner
  • Dennis P. Sheehan
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    Abstract

    We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6550.

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    Date of creation: May 1998
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    Publication status: published as Journal of Finance (April 1999): 435-469.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6550

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    Cited by:
    1. Denis, David J. & Sarin, Atulya, 1999. "Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 187-223, May.
    2. Mazumdar, Surajit, 2008. "Crony Capitalism: Caricature or Category?," MPRA Paper 19626, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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