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Rent-seeking in rural development projects: its potential causes and measures to reduce its costs

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  • Euan Fleming

    (Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of New England, Australia)

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    Abstract

    Projects are a potential source of considerable rent-seeking which detracts from their contributions to rural development. It is the purpose of this paper to out-line the nature of the problems caused by rent-seeking in projects in developing countries, and to identify those situations in which rent-seeking is more likely to be prevalent. Factors influencing susceptibility to rent-seeking are categorized according to whether they are exogenous or endogenous to a particular project. Endogenous factors are decomposed into those embodied in planning and management processes, project attributes or attributes of beneficiaries. This identification provides a platform for suggesting ways of minimizing rent-seeking in rural development projects. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.

    Volume (Year): 10 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 277-299

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    Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:10:y:1998:i:3:p:277-299

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    Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home

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    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Does centralization increase the size of government?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 765-773, April.
    2. Kemp, Murray C. & Wong, Kar-yiu, 1993. "Paradoxes associated with the administration of foreign aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 197-204, October.
    3. Weinstein, David E., 1992. "Competition and unilateral dumping," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 379-388, May.
    4. Gradstein, Mark, 1993. "Rent Seeking and the Provision of Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(420), pages 1236-43, September.
    5. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
    6. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
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