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Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

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  • Gradstein, Mark
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 575-585

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:4:p:575-585

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September.
    2. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, 03.
    3. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-45, October.
    4. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September.
    5. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    6. Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-10, March.
    7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
    8. Konrad, Kai A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1997. "Risk Aversion in Rent-Seeking and Rent-Augmenting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1671-83, November.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    10. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn.
    11. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
    12. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
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