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Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

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Author Info
Gradstein, Mark
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 575-585
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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:4:p:575-585

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Sanghack Lee, 2003. "Two-Stage Contests With Additive Carryovers," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 83-99, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marco Runkel, 2003. "Optimal Contest Design when the Designer's Payoff Depends on Competitive Balance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Felix Várdy & John Morgan, 2005. "The Value of Commitment in Contests and Tournaments when Observation is Costly," Public Economics 0504005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Marco Runkel, 2006. "Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 217-231, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. William Stein & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Symmetric two-stage contests with budget constraints," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 309-328, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Foundations For Contest Success Functions," Economics Working Papers we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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