The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks
AbstractThis article suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by political considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions are instituted for the benefit of the small unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large, multiunit banks. We analyze this "political hypothesis" in two steps. First, we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and government-sponsored deposit insurance. We then find strong evidence for the political hypothesis by examining the voting record of Congress. Copyright 1996 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Columbia - Graduate School of Business in its series Papers with number 95-14.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: U.S.A.; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, PAINE WEBBER , New York, NY 10027 U.S.A
Phone: (212) 854-5553
Web page: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/business/
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POLITICAL ECONOMY; INSURANCE; BANKS; MONOPOLIES; FINANCIAL MARKET;
Other versions of this item:
- Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.
- Nicholas Economides & R. Glen Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1993. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks," Working Papers 93-23, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," NBER Working Papers 5210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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