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The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks

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Author Info
Nicholas Economides
R. Glenn Hubbard
Darius Palia

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Abstract

This paper suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by political considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions were instituted for the benefit of the small, unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large, multi- unit banks. We analyze this 'political hypothesis' in two steps. First, we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and government-sponsored deposit insurance. We then find strong evidence for the political hypothesis by examining the voting record of Congress.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5210.

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Date of creation: Dec 1996
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5210

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G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 1994. "Can deposit insurance increase the risk of bank failure? Some historical evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 57-71. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mark D. Flood, 1992. "The great deposit insurance debate," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-77. [Downloadable!]
  5. Postlewaite, Andrew & Vives, Xavier, 1987. "Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 485-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Economides, Nicholas, 1989. "Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 178-194, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Bank suspension of convertibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report 87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Waldo, Douglas G., 1985. "Bank runs, the deposit-currency ratio and the interest rate," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 269-277, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 415-32, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Abigail Wozniak, 2006. "Product Markets and Paychecks: Deregulation's Effect on the Compensation Structure in Banking," IZA Discussion Papers 1957, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sumru G. Altug & Murat Usman, 2006. "Bank Lending with Imperfect Competition and Spillover Effects," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener, 2005. "Branch banking, bank competition, and financial stability," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  4. Mark Carlson & Kris James Mitchener, 2005. "Branch Banking, Bank Competition, and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 11291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Fredric S. Mishkin & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Will Technology Do to Financial Structure?," NBER Working Papers 6892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Alejandro Micco, 2003. "Concentration and Foreign Penetration in Latin American Banking Sectors: Impact on Competition and Risk," RES Working Papers 4353, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kris James Mitchener, 2006. "Are Prudential Supervision and Regulation Pillars of Financial Stability? Evidence from the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 12074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Alejandro Micco, 2003. "Concentración y penetración foránea en los sectores bancarios latinoamericanos: repercusiones sobre la competencia y el riesgo," RES Working Papers 4354, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Philip E. Strahan, 2003. "The real effects of U.S. banking deregulation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 111-128. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sandra E. Black & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 814-831, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ross Levine & Alexey Levkov & Yona Rubinstein, 2008. "Racial Discrimination and Competition," NBER Working Papers 14273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Tara Rice & Philip E. Strahan, 2008. "Does credit supply affect small-firm finance?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-54, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  13. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Ulrich Lehmann-Grube, 2000. "Spatial Competition in Credit Markets," CSEF Working Papers 32, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Entry restrictions, industry evolution, and dynamic efficiency: evidence from commercial banking," Staff Reports 22, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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