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Special Interest Politics And Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Analysis Of Strengthening Patent Protection In The Pharmaceutical Industry

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ANGUS C. CHU

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Abstract

Since the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policy-makers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free riding on innovations. Copyright 2008 The Author. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00328.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Economics & Politics.

Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 185-215
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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:20:y:2008:i:2:p:185-215

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  4. Segerstrom, Paul S, 1998. "Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1290-1310, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1991. "Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(1), pages 43-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, . "Policy Persistence," CARESS Working Papres 97-2, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Chu, Angus C., 2008. "A Politico-Economic Analysis of the European Union’s R&D Policy," MPRA Paper 10329, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chu, Angus C., 2009. "Macroeconomic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey," MPRA Paper 17342, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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