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The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution

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Abstract

In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.

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  • Stanley L. Winer, 2016. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution," Carleton Economic Papers 16-15, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:16-15
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    Cited by:

    1. Aidt, T. & Winer, S. & Zhang, P., 2020. "Franchise extension and fiscal structure in the United Kingdom 1820-1913: A new test of the Redistribution Hypothesis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2008, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Emilian Dobrescu, 2018. "Functional trinity of public finance in an emerging economy," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Taxation; Oxford Handbook; political economy; public choice; power to tax; tax structure; fiscal redistribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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