Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension
AbstractThis paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism — intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants. Grants, it is argued, serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self-finance their expenditures. The results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector. The results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 62 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Philip J. Grossman, 1989. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An Extension," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series archive-05, Monash University, Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Logan, Robert R, 1986. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1304-18, December.
- Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
- Michael Marlow, 1988. "Fiscal decentralization and government size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 259-269, March.
- Hammes, David L & Wills, Douglas T, 1987. "Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government in Canada," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 707-13, October.
- Nelson, Michael A, 1987. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 198-204, March.
- Philip J. Grossman, 1989.
"Federalism and the Size of Government,"
Development Research Unit Working Paper Series
archive-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Nelson, 1986. "An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 283-294, January.
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