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Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization

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  • Marcelin Joanis

    () (Université de Sherbrooke, GREDI and CIRANO)

Abstract

Decentralization of expenditure responsibilities from central to local governments is generally thought to increase overall government accountability by bringing the policymaking process closer to citizens. In practice, decentralization reforms tend to be partial in nature, leading to the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in public good provision. Electoral accountability in such a context presents voters with the complex task of assessing the respective role of each level of government in the policy outcomes that they observe. This paper analyses the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government’s contribution to the public good. The model predicts that a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) will, in general, have ambiguous consequences for voter welfare, the benefits associated with the vertical complementarity among governments being weighed against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions among levels of government.

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File URL: http://pages.usherbrooke.ca/gredi/wpapers/GREDI-0822.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 08-22.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:shr:wpaper:08-22

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Keywords: decentralization; accountability; shared responsibility; federalism; vertical interactions;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California," Working Papers 2009/33, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  2. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2011. "Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralization," CESifo Working Paper Series 3574, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2010. "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects," Working Papers 2010/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  4. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2012. "Party cues in elections under multilevel governance: Theory and evidence from US states," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-107, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  5. Massimo Bordignon & Santino Piazza, 2010. "Who do you Blame in Local Finance? An Analysis of Municipal Financing in Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3100, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Hickey, Ross, 2010. "Intergovernmental Transfers and Re-Election Concerned Politicians," MPRA Paper 27204, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. James Alm & Robert D. Buschman & David L. Sjoquist, 0. "Citizen "Trust" as an Explanation of State Education Funding to Local School Districts," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 636-661.

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