Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jing Jin

    (Development Research Group, The World Bank)

  • Heng-fu Zou

    (School of Management, Peking University
    Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University
    Development Research Group, The World Bank)

Abstract

Beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size (national and subnational combined), this paper makes the first attempt to examine how different fiscal decentralization measures affect the sizes of national and subnational (state and local combined) governments. An econometric analysis using panel data from 32 industrial and developing countries, 1980¨C1994, finds that (1) expenditure decentralization leads to smaller national governments, larger subnational governments, and larger aggregate governments; (2) revenue decentralization increases subnational governments by less than it reduces national governments, hence leads to smaller aggregate governments; and (3) vertical imbalance tends to increase the sizes of subnational, national, and aggregate governments.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://down.aefweb.net/WorkingPapers/w72.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics in its series CEMA Working Papers with number 72.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 52, Issue 2, September 2002, Pages 270-293
Handle: RePEc:cuf:wpaper:72

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cema.cufe.edu.cn/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Fiscal decentralization; Size of government; Vertical imbalance; Borrowing constraints;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Philip Grossman, 1989. "Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 63-69, July.
  2. Nelson, Michael A, 1987. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 198-204, March.
  3. Jan K. Brueckner, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: The Effects of Local Corruption and Tax Evasion," CEMA Working Papers 1, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, revised Apr 2000.
  4. Tao Zhang & Heng-fu Zou, 2001. "Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China," CEMA Working Papers 58, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
  5. Marlow, Michael L, 1991. " Privatization and Government Size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 273-76, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cuf:wpaper:72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Qiang Gao).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.