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Sharing the Blame? Local Electoral Accountability and Centralized School Finance in California

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Author Info
Marcelin Joanis () (Université de Sherbrooke, GREDI and CIRANO)

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Abstract

While electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to one political office, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This paper investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district’s degree of centralization is high. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.

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File URL: http://pages.usherbrooke.ca/gredi/wpapers/GREDI-0921.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 09-21.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:shr:wpaper:09-21

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Postal: Sherbrooke, Qu�bec, J1K 2R1
Phone: (819) 821-7233
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Web page: https://qp.admnt.usherbrooke.ca/QuickPlace/gredi/Main.nsf/h_Toc/536568F95B90740A85257295005ABBC9/?OpenDocument
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Related research
Keywords: centralization; accountability; school nance; local elections; shared responsibility; No Child Left Behind.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Health, Education, and Welfare
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Card, David & Payne, A. Abigail, 2002. "School finance reform, the distribution of school spending, and the distribution of student test scores," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 49-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hoxby, Caroline M., 1999. "The productivity of schools and other local public goods producers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas J. Nechyba, 2003. "Centralization, Fiscal Federalism, and Private School Attendance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 179-204, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 399-422, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rainald Borck, 2008. "Central versus local education finance: a political economy approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 338-352, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2001. "All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1189-1231, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Christopher R. Berry & William G. Howell, 2007. "Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting," Working Papers 0706, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  8. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2004. "Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?," NBER Working Papers 10591, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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