Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California
AbstractWhile electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to one political office, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This paper investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California’s school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district’s degree of centralization is high. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2009/33.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
centralization; accountability; school finance; local elections; shared responsibility; No Child Left Behind;
Other versions of this item:
- Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "Sharing the Blame? Local Electoral Accountability and Centralized School Finance in California," Cahiers de recherche 09-21, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
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