Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Fiscal decentralization, ideology, and the size of the public sector

Contents:

Author Info

  • Baskaran, T.

Abstract

No consensus has yet emerged on whether fiscal decentralization facilitates or impedes the growth of the public sector. One explanation for this ambiguity in the literature is that the effect of fiscal decentralization on public sector size depends on the government’s ideology. This paper therefore develops a simple model to study theoretically how interactions between fiscal decentralization and the ideology of the government may influence the size of the public sector. Thereafter, the implications of the model are tested empirically with panel data from 18 OECD countries over the 1980-2000 period.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30188/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30188.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30188

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Electoral competition; Fiscal decentralization; Public sector size;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hindricks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2007. "Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in Decentralized Governments?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1946, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Philip J. Grossman, 1989. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An Extension," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series archive-05, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  4. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
  5. Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2011. "Bailouts in a fiscal federal system: Evidence from Spain," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 154-170, March.
  6. Grossman, Philip J & West, Edwin G, 1994. " Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 19-32, April.
  7. Jin, Jing & Zou, Heng-fu, 2002. "How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 270-293, September.
  8. de Mello, Luiz Jr, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 365-380, February.
  9. Ernesto Stein, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 357-391, November.
  10. Lars P Feld & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "State and local taxation," Economics working papers 2000-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  11. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  12. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  13. Bilin Neyapti, 2003. "Fiscal Decentralisation and Deficits: International Evidence," Working Papers 2003/2, Turkish Economic Association.
  14. Dan Stegarescu, 2005. "Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent international trends," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 301-333, September.
  15. Rodden, Jonathan, 2003. "Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(04), pages 695-729, September.
  16. Marlow, Michael L, 1991. " Privatization and Government Size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 273-76, January.
  17. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
  18. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roberto Dell'Anno & Désirée Teobaldelli, 2012. "Keeping both Corruption and the Shadow Economy in Check: The Role of Decentralization," Working Papers 1213, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2012.
  2. Kaushik, Arun & Rupayan Pal, 2012. "Political strongholds and budget allocation for developmental expenditure: Evidence from Indian states, 1971-2005," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2012-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  3. Aristovnik, Aleksander, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization in Eastern Europe: a twenty-year perspective," MPRA Paper 39316, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Zohal Hessami, 2013. "Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition: Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-27, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  5. Osterloh, Steffen & Debus, Marc, 2012. "Partisan politics in corporate taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 192-207.
  6. David Cantarero & Patricio Perez, 2012. "Decentralization and regional government size in Spain," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 211-237, December.
  7. Shih-Ying Wu & Mei-Jane Teng, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 237-262, September.
  8. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Economides, George & Kammas, Pantelis, 2012. "Does cabinet ideology matter for the structure of tax policies?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 620-635.
  9. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30188. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.