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Fiscal descentralization and government size in Latin America

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  • Stein, Ernesto H.

Abstract

Although the region remains highly centralized, the tendency toward decentralization is quite strong. Not only is a larger portion of the general government budget executed from the subnational government level, the autonomy that these governments have in deciding how much to spend and what to spend on is increasing as well. In this context, it is important to analyze the possible effects of the move toward decentralization on fiscal performance.
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  • Stein, Ernesto H., 1998. "Fiscal descentralization and government size in Latin America," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34390, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col093:34390
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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