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Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index

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  • Laruelle, Annick
  • Valenciano, Federico

Abstract

In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We show how the Shapley-Shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of 'bargaining power' that appear in this light as limit cases.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 63 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 341-353

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:341-353

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Cited by:
  1. Thorsten Upmann & Julia M�ller, 2013. "The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-080/I, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Drouvelis, Michalis & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2010. "Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 274-292, July.
  3. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program," Economics Series 2012_9, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  4. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
  5. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Britz Volker & Predtetchinski Arkadi, 2012. "On the Convergence to Nash Bargaining Solution for Endogenous Bargaining Protocols," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  6. Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Voting Chances Instead of Voting Weights," ISLA Working Papers 40, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  7. Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2013. "Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-051/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  9. BRITZ, Volker & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi, 2013. "On the Convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols," CORE Discussion Papers 2013044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Masanori Mitsutsune & Takanori Adachi, 2011. "Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison," KIER Working Papers 799, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

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