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Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices

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Author Info
Donal G. Saari
Katri K. Sieberg
Abstract

A troubling aspect about power indices is how the values assigned to players can depend upon the index. As shown, the problem is more severe; different indices can generate radically different rankings; e.g., a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict power index rankings of the players. It is shown that certain indices always share the same ranking, but this assertion depends on the number of players; e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but with more players they can even have opposite rankings. It is also shown how changes in certain assumptions affect the outcomes. This includes demonstrating how the rankings change when players drop out of a game.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1271.

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Date of creation: Sep 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1271

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  1. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Iñaki García & Esther Gutiérrez & Emilio Calvo, 1999. "Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 491-512. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Chris Geller & Jamie Mustard & Ranya Shahwan, 2007. "Focused Power: Experimental Manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index," Economics Series 2007_13, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chris GELLER & Jamie MUSTARD & Ranya SHAHWAN, 2004. "Standard Voting Power Indices Work: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Voting Power," Economics Series 2004_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Tuerlinckx, Francis, 2002. "The Mathematics and Statistics of Voting Power," Working Papers 1141, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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