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A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index

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  • Barua, Rana
  • Chakravarty, Satya R.
  • Roy, Sonali
  • Sarkar, Palash

Abstract

A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhafï¾–Colemanï¾–Dubeyï¾–Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 49 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 31-48

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:1:p:31-48

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
  2. Andrzej S. Nowak, 1997. "note: On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value without the Additivity Axiom," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 137-141.
  3. R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
  4. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2007. "Measuring Power in Weighted Majority Games," Staff General Research Papers 12809, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2006. "On the Coleman indices of voting power," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 171(1), pages 273-289, May.
  2. Maria Axenovich & Sonali Roy, 2010. "On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 429-440, March.
  3. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Sarkar, Palash, 2009. "Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 367-375, November.

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