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A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index

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Author Info

  • Barua, Rana
  • Chakravarty, Satya R.
  • Roy, Sonali
  • Sarka, Palash

Abstract

A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhafï¾–Colemanï¾–Dubeyï¾–Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12807.

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Date of creation: 07 May 2007
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Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, October 2004, vol. 49 no. 1, pp. 31-48
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12807

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Keywords: voting game; characterization; The Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index; Bounds;

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  1. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2007. "Measuring Power in Weighted Majority Games," Staff General Research Papers 12809, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
  3. Andrzej S. Nowak, 1997. "note: On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value without the Additivity Axiom," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 137-141.
  4. R J Johnston, 1978. "On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 10(8), pages 907-914, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Maria Axenovich & Sonali Roy, 2010. "On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 429-440, March.
  2. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Sanya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2007. "On the Coleman Indices of Voting Power," Staff General Research Papers 12810, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Sarkar, Palash, 2009. "Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 367-375, November.

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