Measuring Power in Weighted Majority Games
AbstractThis paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power determines the ability of a voter to inï¬‚uence the outcomes of the voting bodies he belongs to. In a weighted majority game each voter is assigned a certain nonnegative real number weight and there is a positive real number quota such that a group of voters can pass a resolution if the sum of the weights of the group members is at least as high as the given quota. The new index is shown to satisfy all the reasonable postulates for an index of voting power. If attention is restricted to weighted majority game only, then this index may be considered as an extension of the Banzhaf-Coleman power indices. Finally, the paper develops an axiomatic charï¾acterization of the new index.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12809.
Date of creation: 07 May 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Homo Oeconomicus 2005, vol. 22 no. 4, pp. 459-486
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash, 2004.
"A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-48, October.
- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarka, Palash, 2007. "A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index," Staff General Research Papers 12807, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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