On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash, 2004.
"A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-48, October.
- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarka, Palash, 2007. "A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index," Staff General Research Papers 12807, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 1996. "Complete simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 139-155, October.
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