On the Coleman Indices of Voting Power
AbstractColeman [1971. Control of collectives and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp. 269ï¾–298] suggested two indices of voting power, power to prevent an action and power to initiate an action. This paper rigorously demonstrates relationship between the two indices and shows that they satisfy several attractive properties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12810.
Date of creation: 07 May 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Journal of Operational Research, May 2006, vol. 171 no. 1, pp. 273-289
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
voting game; Game theory; Voting power; Colemanâ€™s indices; Properties;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash, 2004.
"A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-48, October.
- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarka, Palash, 2007. "A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index," Staff General Research Papers 12807, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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- Manfred J. Holler & Stefan Napel, 2004.
"Monotonicity of power and power measures,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 93-111, 02.
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- Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2002. "Assessment Of Voting Situations: The Probabilistic Foundations," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
- Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 339-56.
- (*), Gerard van der Laan & RenÊ van den Brink, 1998. "Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 567-582.
- Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December.
- Roy, Sonali, 2008. "The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 296-300, September.
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