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A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers

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Author Info
Okada, Akira
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 16 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 97-108
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:97-108

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Montero, M., 2002. "Two-stage bargaining with reversible coalitions : the case of apex games," Discussion Paper 26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Maria Montero, 2006. "Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity," Working Papers 2006.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value," Game Theory and Information 0401003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," MPRA Paper 17606, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Maria Montero, 2005. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Game Theory and Information 0512004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
  9. Eraslan, H. & Merlo, A., 2000. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Working Papers 00-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Francis Bloch & Armando Gomes, 2004. "Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options," Working Papers 2004.78, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hideo Konishi & Margarita Sapozhnikov, 2006. "Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 654, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Montero, M., 1999. "Noncooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  14. A. Mauleon & V. Vannetelbosch, 2000. "Coalitional Negotiation with Monitoring," THEMA Working Papers 2000-35, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  15. Montero, M., 2001. "The nucleolus as a consistent power index in noncooperative majority games," Discussion Paper 39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  17. James M. Snyder & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!]
  18. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2009. "Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 291-306, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicol? Porteiro, 2002. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 515.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  20. Montero, M., 1999. "Coalition formation in games with externalities," Discussion Paper 121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  21. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition," Working Papers 05-10, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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