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Akira Okada

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Personal Details

First Name: Akira
Middle Name:
Last Name: Okada
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RePEc Short-ID: pok50

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~aokada/English.html
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Affiliation

Graduate School of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
Location: Tokyo, Japan
Homepage: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/
Email:
Phone: +81-42-580-8000
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Postal:
Handle: RePEc:edi:fehitjp (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Okada, Akira, 2012. "The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification," Discussion Papers 2012-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2009. "Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations," Discussion Papers 2009-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Okada, Akira, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Okada, Akira, 2007. "Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 2007-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2007. "Multiplicity and Sensitivity of Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games," Discussion Papers 2007-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Okada, Akira, 2006. "The Second-Order Dilemma of Public Goods and Capital Accumulation," Discussion Papers 2006-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Kosfeld, Michael & Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," IZA Discussion Papers 2288, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2006. "Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games," Discussion Papers 2006-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Okada, Akira, 2005. "A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 2005-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  10. Okada, Akira, 2005. "Accumulation of Public Goods and Population Change in a Voluntary Participation Game," Discussion Papers 2005-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  11. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2005. "Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games," Discussion Papers 2005-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  12. Akira Okada, 2004. "International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol," KIER Working Papers 579, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Maria Montero & Akira Okada, 2003. "Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: the Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0305002, EconWPA.
  14. Okada, Akiro & Riedl, Arno, 1999. "Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game," Economics Series 64, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  15. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-043/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  16. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-044/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  17. Akira Okada, 1987. "Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games," Discussion Papers 719, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Akira Okada, 1986. "A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 706, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2012. "Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 269-284.
  2. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
  3. Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira, 2012. "Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 31-42.
  4. Gary Biglaiser & Kazuo Nishimura & Akira Okada & Makoto Yano, 2011. "Introduction," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 1-6, 03.
  5. Kazuo Nishimura & Akira Okada & Yoshikazu Tobinaga, 2011. "Ability to stop thinking and strategy choice in dilemma games," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 133-146, 03.
  6. Okada, Akira, 2011. "Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 227-235, September.
  7. "Okada, Akira" & ", ", 2010. "Toshiji Kawagoe, Experimental Economics," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 61(1), pages 85-87, January.
  8. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
  9. Akira Okada, 2009. "Announcement," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 33-34.
  10. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2009. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1335-55, September.
  11. Akira Okada, 2008. "The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 165-182, June.
  12. Maria Montero & Akira Okada, 2007. "Risky Versus Riskless Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 294-302.
  13. Okada, Akira & Riedl, Arno, 2005. "Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 278-311, February.
  14. Haruo Imai & Akira Okada, 2005. "Introduction," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 249-250.
  15. Akira Okada & Eyal Winter, 2002. "A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 1-28, August.
  16. Akira Okada, 2000. "The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 34-50, 03.
  17. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
  18. Koichi Suga & Akira Okada & Kenichi Sakakibara, 1996. "The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: a game theoretic approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21.
  19. "Okada, Akira", 1994. "The Formation and Development of Social Organizations―A Game Theoretic Approach―," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 45(3), pages 238-247, July.
  20. Okada, Akira, 1993. " The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 629-56, November.
  21. Okada, Akira, 1991. "Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 95-108.
  22. Okada, A, 1988. "Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 225-39.
  23. Okada, Akira, 1983. "Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 337-351, December.

NEP Fields

9 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (2) 2006-09-23 2006-10-07
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (6) 1999-07-28 1999-07-28 2006-09-23 2006-10-07 2009-05-09 2010-01-16. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2009-05-09 2010-01-16
  4. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2009-05-09
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (4) 1999-07-28 1999-07-28 2006-09-23 2006-10-07. Author is listed
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (6) 2006-09-23 2006-10-07 2009-05-09 2009-05-09 2010-01-16 2012-11-11. Author is listed
  7. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2012-11-11
  8. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2012-11-11
  9. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2006-09-23 2006-10-07
  10. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (2) 2006-09-23 2006-10-07

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