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Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence

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Okada, Akira
Riedl, Arno

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 50 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 278-311
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:278-311

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
  2. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Prasnikar, Vesna & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 865-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994. "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
  11. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-043/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
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  1. Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2005. "Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0507001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Holm, Håkan, 2000. "What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment," Working Papers 2000:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Apr 2001. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Abbink & Matthew Ellman, 2004. "The Donor Problem," Economics Working Papers 796, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  4. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-043/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2007. "Organisational structure, communication and group ethics," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 682.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  6. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Riedl, A. & Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Social preference in three-player ultimatum game experiments," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2004. "The Behavioral Tradeoff between Efficiency and Equity when a Majority Rules," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gary E Bolton & Jeannette Brosig, 2007. "How do coalitions get built - Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with renegotiation & externalities," Working Paper Series in Economics 30, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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