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Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Guth, Werner
Huck, Steffen
Ockenfels, Peter

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Abstract

In a two-level ultimatum game, one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size whose a priori probabilities were commonly known. The fact that most proposers with the large cake offered two-thirds of the small cake has important implications for the theory of distributive justice: better informed parties do not question that others want a fair share and, thus, pretend fairness by 'hiding behind some small cake.' Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 106 (1996)
Issue (Month): 436 (May)
Pages: 593-604
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:106:y:1996:i:436:p:593-604

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  1. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 482-493. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Bargaining Outside the Lab – A Newspaper Experiment of a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-11, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control without Deception," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-107/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alan Manning, 2007. "Respect," CEP Discussion Papers dp0793, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pamela Schmitt, 2004. "On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 49-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Guth, W. & Kroger, S. & Maug, E., 2003. "You may have to do it again, Rocky! - An expirimental analysis of bargaining with risky joint profits -," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Grimalda, Gianluca & Kar, Anirban & Proto, Eugenio, 2006. "On the Value of Participation: Endogenous Emergence of Social Norms in a Three-Player Ultimatum Game," MPRA Paper 1620, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003. "Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining," Working Paper Series rwp03-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
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  10. G. Coricelli & L.G. Morales & A. Mahlstedt, . "The investment game with asymmetric information," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations," IZA Discussion Papers 887, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Werner Güth, 2005. "On Inequity Aversion," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-24, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  14. Fabienne Tournadre & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Learning from Strikes," Post-Print halshs-00151430_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Riedl, A. & Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Social preference in three-player ultimatum game experiments," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market," IZA Discussion Papers 855, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  17. Paul J. Ferraro & Ronald G. Cummings, 2005. "Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and Economic Outcomes: an experimental analysis," Artefactual Field Experiments 0040, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
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