We present a simple model of voluntary groups in a collective action problem where individuals differ in their willingness to cooperate. The heterogeneity of individuals' preferences generally yields multiple equilibrium groups with different levels of cooperation. Voluntary participation in a binding contract to cooperate does not necessarily lead to the full cooperation. Applications to voluntary provision of public goods and cartel formation in oligopolistic markets are discussed.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number
2005-07.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)