Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types

Contents:

Author Info

  • OKADA, Akira
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We consider a non-cooperative two-person sequential bargaining game with incomplete information. Player types are verifiable when a con-tract is implemented. We show that there is no delay in agreements and the inscrutability principle holds under the property of independence of irrelevant types (IIT), whereby the response of every type of player is independent of proposals to other player types. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium satisfying IIT and a self-selection property for every discount factor for future payoffs. We also show that the equilibrium proposal of every player converges to the ex post Nash bargaining solution as the discount factor goes to one.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/26008/1/070econDP13-15.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-15.

    as in new window
    Length: 40 p.
    Date of creation: Dec 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2013-15

    Contact details of provider:
    Phone: +81-42-580-8000
    Web page: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: bargaining; incomplete information; mechanism selection; ex post Nash bargaining solution; non-cooperative games;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-87, March.
    2. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    10. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
    11. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April.
    12. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
    13. de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers 2002063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2013-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.