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Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining

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  • Eraslan, Hülya
  • McLennan, Andrew

Abstract

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposerʼs identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 2195-2222

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2195-2222

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Keywords: Noncooperative bargaining; Multilateral bargaining; TU games; Simple games; Coalitions; Legislative bargaining; Fixed points; Fixed point index;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maria Montero, 2010. "Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2010-19, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Yves Breitmoser, 2011. "Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 149-169, June.
  3. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers, Job Market Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
  4. Michel Le Breton & Maria Montero & Vera Zaporozhets, 2011. "Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2011-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  5. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2009. "Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 291-306, May.
  6. Le Breton, Michel & Thomas, Alban & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion," LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse 12.12.369, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  7. Maria Montero, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2007-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J Seidmann, 2012. "Bargaining in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2012-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  9. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, . "Gaining Power through Enlargement: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 09/30, Department of Economics, University of York.

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