Is the Allocation of Voting Power Among the EU States Fair?
AbstractThis paper assesses the current distribution of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers in terms of fairness. The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, we define fairness in the European context and discuss the potential definitions of the European Union; a state, an association of states or a federal state. Second, we look for a definition of the EU which, in terms of power allocation, corresponds best to the respective fairness criteria. Lastly, we suggest an empirical method to determine fair power allocations with a given definition of the EU.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1402.
Date of creation: May 1996
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- Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1996. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among the EU States Fair?," Discussion Papers 556, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
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