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Demand commitment in legislative bargaining

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Author Info
Maria Montero (University of Nottingham)
Juan Vidal-Puga (University of Vigo)

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Abstract

Morelli (American Political Science Review, 1999) provides a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the homogeneous representation of the game. We provide a counterexample and prove a weaker result: proportional payoffs hold if the rules are modified so that the parties must move in decreasing order of weight.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0511005.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 14 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 45
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: demand commitment majority games politics;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. (*), Y. Stephen Chiu & Ani Dasgupta, 1998. "On implementation via demand commitment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 161-189. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 255-73, March.
  8. Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch, 2002. "Agenda control in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 769-788. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-54, June.
  10. Selten,Reinhard, . "A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining," Discussion Paper Serie B 191, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  12. James M. Snyder & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!]
  13. McKelvey, Richard D. & Riezman, Raymond., 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures," Working Papers 725, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  14. Morelli, Massimo & Montero, Maria, 2003. "The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 137-155, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  16. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2006. "Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures," Discussion Papers 2006-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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