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An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures

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Daniel Diermeier
Antoni Merlo

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Abstract

Models of government formation processes in multi-party democracies are unusually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs. The formal literature has exclusively focused on two selection rules: selection proportional to seat share (Baron and Ferejohn 1989), and selection in order of seat share (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988). In this paper we use a new data set on government formation attempts in 12 multi-party democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data. We find that while there is no empirical support for selection in order of seat share, proportional selection may serve as a good first approximation. However, our results also indicate that formateur selection exhibits a significant incumbency effect: ceteris paribus, the former prime minister's party is more likely to be selected to attempt the formation of the next government.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1267.

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Date of creation: Jan 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1267

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
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  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1998. "Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 685-694, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kóczy Lászlo Á., 2006. "Voting Paradoxes and the Human Intuition," Research Memoranda 048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2001. "Political Data for Applied Political Economy Research," Working Papers 43, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2001. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  4. James M. Snyder & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September. [Downloadable!]
  5. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," Wallis Working Papers WP38, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  8. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2008. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/192, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  9. Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Eraslan, H. & Merlo, A., 2000. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Working Papers 00-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  12. Massimo Morelli & Michele Tertilt, 2000. "Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems," Working Papers 00-13, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. David Austen-Smith, 1998. "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation," Discussion Papers 1270, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Enriqueta Aragonès, 2007. "Government formation in a two dimensional policy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-184, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bloch, Francis & Rottier, StŽphane, 1999. "Agenda Control in Coalition Formation," Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Discussion Paper 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  16. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  17. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  18. G Frechette & J Kagel & M Morelli, 2004. "Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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