Agenda control in coalition formation
AbstractTheoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1999067.
Date of creation: 31 Dec 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Bloch, Francis & Rottier, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda Control in Coalition Formation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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