Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
AbstractIn the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 24995.
Date of creation: 14 Sep 2010
Date of revision:
coalition formation; non-cooperative bargaining; core;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-09-25 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2010-09-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-09-25 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Theodore Turocy, 2010. "Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 255-269, January.
- Torsten Persson, 2002.
"Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 883-905, May.
- Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
- Yves Breitmoser & Jonathan H.W. Tan & Daniel John Zizzo, 2008.
"Understanding Perpetual R&D Races,"
2008-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Yves Breitmoser & Jonathan H.W. Tan & Daniel John Zizzo, 2008. "Understanding Perpetual R&D Races," Discussion Papers 2008-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Yves Breitmoser & Jonathan H. W. Tan & Daniel John Zizzo, 2008. "Understanding Perpetual R&D Races," Working Papers 08-22, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
- Kultti, K.K., 1997.
"A Model of Random Matching and Price Formation,"
1997-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Reinhard Selten, 1974. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games," Working Papers 023, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- David Austen-Smith, 2000. "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1235-1269, December.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985.
"Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining,"
Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September.
- Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
- Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
- Daniel Cardona-Coll & Francisco M. Mancera, 2000. "Demand bargaining in legislatures," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 163-180.
- Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 255-73, March.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2004.
"Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP37, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 309-329, 06.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, H�lya & Merlo, Antonio, 2007.
"Bicameralism and Government Formation,"
International Quarterly Journal of Political Science,
now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 227-252, August.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998.
"Government turnover in parliamentary democracies,"
7453, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Working Papers 98-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998.
"Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game,"
1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2006. "A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 49-85, January.
- John Wooders, 1997. "Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 215-224.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
- Turocy, Theodore L., 2005. "A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 243-263, May.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
- David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2011. "Binomial menu auctions in government formation," MPRA Paper 28576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.