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A Structural Model of Government Formation

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Author Info
Daniel Diermeier () (Northwestern University, U.S.A)
Hulya Eraslan () (University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.)
Antonio Merlo () (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U.S.A)

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Abstract

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 71 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 27-70
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:71:y:2003:i:1:p:27-70

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  1. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?," NBER Working Papers 10176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  3. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2006. "Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures," Discussion Papers 2006-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  6. Yasutora Watanabe & Takanori Adachi, 2004. "Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 742, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2008. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/192, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  8. Brian Knight, 2004. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 10530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antonio Merlo & Daniel Diermeier & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  11. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  12. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2006. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000706, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Roland, Gerard, 2003. "New governance of Europe: Parliamentary or presidential?, The," IESE Research Papers D/503, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
  14. M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties," Working Papers 2009-3, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  15. Brian Knight, 2005. "Estimating the Value of Proposal Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1639-1652, December. [Downloadable!]
  16. Daniel Seidmann & Eyal Winter & Elan Pavlov, 2007. "The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 427-445, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Khemani, Stuti & Wane, Waly, 2008. "Populist fiscal policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4762, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  18. Enriqueta Aragonès, 2007. "Government formation in a two dimensional policy space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-184, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
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