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A Structural Model of Government Formation

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Sven de Vries
Rakesh Vohra
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1297.

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Date of creation: May 2000
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1297

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  1. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
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  3. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
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  4. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 39-55. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 3120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 629-637, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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