Agenda control in coalition formation
AbstractTheoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 26 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- BLOCH, Francis & ROTTIER, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda control in coalition formation," CORE Discussion Papers 1999067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bloch, Francis & Rottier, Stéphane, 1999. "Agenda Control in Coalition Formation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1999034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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