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Political Institutions and Economic Growth Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Marsiliani, Laura
Renström, Thomas I
We analyze the impact of micro-founded political institutions on economic growth in an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour and capital taxes finance the public good and a public input. The benchmark institution is a parliament, where all decisions are taken. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. We compare this constitution to delegation of decision-making, where a spending minister (elected in parliament or appointed by the largest party). Delegation of decision-making tends to yield lower growth, mainly due to the occurrence of production inefficiency.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
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Keywords: bargaining endogenous growth overlapping generations taxation voting Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
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Gylfason, Thorvaldur / Hochreiter, Eduard, 2007.
"Growing Apart? A Tale of Two Republics: Estonia and Georgia ,"
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