Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Jeffrey Scot Banks
• John Duggan

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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP24.

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Date of creation: Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp24

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, Wallis Institute, HARKNESS 109B ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

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1. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
2. Kevin Roberts, 2005. "Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting," Economics Papers 2005-W15, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kevin Roberts, 2005. "Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 236, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Kevin Roberts, 2007. "Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 383-404, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas I, 2007. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
5. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2003. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Working Papers 1163, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan, 2006. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 285-304, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Casamatta, Georges & De Paoli, Caroline, 2004. "Ex Post Inefficiency in a Political Agency Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4275, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2006. "Political reputations and campaign promises," Working Papers 1258, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Political Reputations and Campaign Promises," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 846-884, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renström, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 233-261, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Kenneth Shotts, 2006. "A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 251-261, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Thomas Renstrom & Laura Marsiliani, 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 53, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]

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