A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP24.
Date of creation: Nov 2001
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Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
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- Thomas Renstrom & Laura Marsiliani, 2005. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 53, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
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- Adam Meirowitz, 2005. "Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 299-318, March.
- Kenneth Shotts, 2006. "A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 251-261, October.
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"Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting,"
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- Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas I, 2007. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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