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Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation

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  • Baron, David P.

    (Stanford U)

  • Diermeier, Daniel

    (Northwestern U)

  • Fong, Pohan

    (Concordia U)

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo also affects the bargaining power of the parties during government formation and their respective policy choices. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent government formation. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1960.

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Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1960

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Cited by:
  1. Francesco Giovannoni, 2012. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/624, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  2. Laura Marsiliani & Thomas Renström, 2007. "Political institutions and economic growth," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 233-261, May.
  3. Pohan Fong & Daniel Diermeier, 2007. "Policy Persistence in Multi-party Parliamentary Democracies," 2007 Meeting Papers 248, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas I, 2007. "Political Institutions and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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