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Corruption and Power in Democracies

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Author Info
Francesco Giovannoni
Daniel J. Seidmann ()
Abstract

According to Acton: “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. We study the implications of Acton’s dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton’s dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which cover plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 08/192.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:08/192

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption; government dynamics;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
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  2. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 2006. "Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 108(4), pages 727-742, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994. "On the Measurement of Polarization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 819-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Cristina Bicchieri & John Duffy, 1997. "Corruption Cycles," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 477-495. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  9. Hauk, Esther & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2002. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 311-335, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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