Helios Herrera () (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)) David K. Levine () (Department of Economics, UCLA) Cesar Martinelli () (Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending in the United States has increased at the same time that politics has become more polarized. We find that the popular explanation better targeting of campaign spending is not a likely explanation. While better targeting does lead to greater spending, it leads to less polarization. Instead we argue that the likely explanation is that voters references have become more volatile. This will both raise campaign spending and increase polarization. At the same time it is consistent with the observation that voters have become less committed to the two parties.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number
0503.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004.
"Vote Buying,"
Discussion Papers
1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005.
"Vote Buying,"
Others
0503006, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005.
"Vote buying,"
Working Papers
1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.