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The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections

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  • Matias Iaryczower
  • Andrea Mattozzi

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  • Matias Iaryczower & Andrea Mattozzi, 2012. "The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 591-619, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:49:y:2012:i:3:p:591-619
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0613-y
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    21. Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César, 2008. "Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 501-513, April.
    22. Marie Rekkas, 2007. "The Impact of Campaign Spending on Votes in Multiparty Elections," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 573-585, August.
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    24. Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 357-377, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Squintani, 2012. "Introduction to the symposium in political economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 513-519, April.
    2. R. Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2014. "Voting as a signaling device," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 753-777, April.
    3. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 1-19, May.
    4. Aytimur, Refik Emre, 2013. "Extreme parties and political rents," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 161, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    5. Rebecca Morton & Roger Myerson, 2012. "Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 571-590, April.
    6. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
    7. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2015. "Mediocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 32-44.
    8. Denter, Philipp, 2020. "Campaign contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    9. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem & Shmuel Nitzan, 2013. "The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 77-105, February.
    10. Arianna Degan, 2013. "Civic duty and political advertising," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 531-564, March.
    11. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2013. "Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Campaigns?," Economics Working Paper Series 1326, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    12. Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2013. "A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 941-977, April.
    13. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2012. "When do simple policies win?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 621-637, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Campaign spending; Elections; Campaign limits; Political parties; D72; D78; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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