Voting as a Signaling Device
AbstractIn this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefi t of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon e ffects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Courant Research Centre PEG in its series Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers with number 108.
Date of creation: 26 Jan 2012
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electoral incentives; signaling; voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Schwager, Robert & Aytimur, R. Emre & Boukouras, Aristotelis, 2012. "Voting as a Signaling Device," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62075, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "Voting as a Signaling Device," CESifo Working Paper Series 3700, CESifo Group Munich.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-02-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2012-02-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-POL-2012-02-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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