In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
6163.
Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007.
"Mediocracy,"
NBER Working Papers
12920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2006.
"Mediocracy,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ernesto Dal Bo & Pedro Dal Bo & Jason Snyder, .
"Political Dynasties,"
Working Papers
2006-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2007.
"Political Dynasties,"
NBER Working Papers
13122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
ERNESTO DAL BÓ & PEDRO DAL BÓ & JASON SNYDER, 2009.
"Political Dynasties,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142, 01.
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