Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes
AbstractWe provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can result via any of these processes. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by now publishers in its journal International Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
Volume (Year): 2 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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