Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection
AbstractThis paper presents a model of candidate selection through political parties where politicians differ in terms of their quality and their favored policies. The central assumption is that political parties are better informed about their potential candidates than voters are. In addition, parties pursue political goals that differ from the interest of the median voter. Questions of interest include whether voters can gain information about candidates by observing the parties choice and to what extent parties select the candidates preferred by the median voter. The results depend crucially on how competitive the race is. Under strong competition, nominating a politically more extreme politician is a signal of high quality. Sufficient competition also induces parties to act in the interest of the median voter most of the time. Nevertheless, in most cases the median voter would be better off if parties shared his political preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 42678.
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Political parties; electoral competition; valence; candidate selection; primaries;
Other versions of this item:
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 44462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-12-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-12-06 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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