Information and Extremism in Elections
AbstractWe show that informative political campaigns can increase political extremism and decrease voter welfare. We present a model of elections in which candidate ideology is strategically selected prior to a campaign which reveals information about candidate quality. Documented means by which campaigns can harm voters are not present in our model; special interest groups, fundraising, and biased or private information are not part of the analysis. Even under these optimistic assumptions, informative campaigns have negative consequences. Our results have implications regarding media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Miami, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-04.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 248126, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6550
Phone: (305) 284-5540
Fax: (305) 284-2985
Web page: http://www.bus.miami.edu/faculty-and-research/academic-departments/economics/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Campaigns; elections; persuasion; policy divergence; probabilistic voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-02-03 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"The economics of career concerns: part 1 :comparing information structures,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9617, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January.
- Stephen Coate, 2004.
"Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, 09.
- Stephen Coate, 2001. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," NBER Working Papers 8693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Andrea Prat, 2005.
"The Wrong Kind of Transparency,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999.
"Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Helios Herrera & David K. Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2005.
"Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation,"
0503, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César, 2008. "Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 501-513, April.
- Helios Herrera & David K Levine & Cesar Martinelli, 2007. "Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000935, David K. Levine.
- Moscarini, Giuseppe & Ottaviani, Marco, 2001.
"Price Competition for an Informed Buyer,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 457-493, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Richard Holden, 2008.
"Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002358, David K. Levine.
- Kittsteiner, Thomas & Eyster, Erik, 2007. "Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 41-70, March.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007.
"The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 311-315, May.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Palda, Filip & Palda, Kristian, 1998. " The Impact of Campaign Expenditures on Political Competition in the French Legislative Elections of 1993," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 157-74, January.
- Prat, A., 1997.
"Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare,"
1997-118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dan Bernhardt & Odilon C�mara & Francesco Squintani, 2011. "Competence and Ideology," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 487-522.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas. R., 2000.
"Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model With a Favored Candidate,"
1102, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Micael Castanheira De Moura & Juan Carrillo, 2008.
"Information and strategic political polarization,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/10003, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Nicolas Sahuguet & Nicola Persico, 2006. "Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 95-124, 05.
- Filip Palda & Kristian Palda, 1998. "The impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the French legislative elections of 1993," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 157-174, January.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012.
"Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection,"
42678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 44462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2013.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher Parmeter).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.