Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andrea Mattozzi

    ()
    (Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology)

  • Antonio Merlo

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the transparency of politics and the quality of politicians in a model of parties’ political recruitment. We find that an increase in the transparency of politics reduces the average quality of the politicians a party recruits in equilibrium

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/working-papers/07-008.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 07-008.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-008

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Email:
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Transparency; politicians; parties; political recruitment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  2. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 12921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
  4. Andrea Prat, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
  6. Ernesto Dal Bo, 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 39, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Carrillo, Juan D. & Mariotti, Thomas, 2001. "Electoral competition and politician turnover," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, January.
  8. Alessandro Gavazza & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2009. "Transparency and Economic Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 1023-1048.
  9. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties As Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2007. "Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 07-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Kaisa Kotakorpi & Panu Poutvaara & Marko Terviö, 2013. "Returns to Office in National and Local Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 4542, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Motz, Nicolas, 2012. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," MPRA Paper 42678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2012. "Information and Extremism in Elections," Working Papers, University of Miami, Department of Economics 2013-04, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  5. Thomas Markussen & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010. "Serving the Public Interest," NRN working papers, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria 2010-21, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  6. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
  7. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2008. "Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2008/18, European University Institute.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Transparency (behavior) in Wikipedia English ne '')

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.